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One year after being tasked by European Union (EU) leaders to prepare an EU global strategy on foreign
and security policy, High Representative Federica Mogherini presented the paper at the European Council
on 28 June. Nobody would have thought, back in June 2015, that the EU Global Strategy (EUGS) would be
delivered only a few days after the UK voting to leave the Union – a political tsunami that is shaking the
foundations of European integration.
Foreign policy strategies are the product of the intersection between domestic politics and the international
environment. They express the values, interests and priorities of the political actors adopting them and
outline how to advance these goals on the global stage. This requires aligning means and ends as well as
offering organising principles that can frame external action across a wide policy spectrum. 
The new EUGS makes no exception: the internal and external contexts of its elaboration are crucial to assess
its main rationale, features, added value and prospects. In the case of the EU, the domestic context needs
consideration at two levels. Looking at the level of EU politics, the cohesion of the Union is under
unprecedented strain. The Brexit vote is the culmination of a series of interrelated crises that have deepened
political polarisation within and between member states and engendered huge uncertainty about the future
of Europe. On another level, given that EU foreign policy is the product of intergovernmental negotiations
and inter-institutional processes, its institutional foundations are a critical enabler of effective external
action. The Lisbon Treaty has introduced reforms directed to provide more leadership, continuity and
coherence to EU foreign policy but disconnects between EU bodies and little ownership by member states
continue to affect the Union's international role. 
As to the international context, the review of the global environment presented by High Representative
Mogherini in June 2015 noted that over the previous decade or so "the world – and our perception of it –
has become more dangerous, divided and disorienting…more connected but also more contested; more
integrated but also more fragmented: it is much more complex." In other words, EU foreign policy unfolds
in a much less permissive and more unstable environment than at the time of the adoption of the European
Security Strategy (ESS) back in 2003.
The EUGS aims to provide strategic coordinates for European foreign policy in the midst of political turmoil.
The paper recalibrates the overall foreign policy posture of the EU. It sketches out a more modest and more
concrete approach compared to earlier aspirations, and a more joined-up one compared to current
 
2practice. By doing so, the strategy seeks to square the circle between the need for Europe to be cohesive
and purposeful in a harder strategic environment and the fact that contested politics within the Union
constrain its external action and drain its attractiveness. The EUGS calls on the EU and member states to
fully take on their responsibility to underpin unity, prosperity and security at home by taking more effective
and joined-up action abroad. The question is, of course, whether this call will be heeded.
What the strategy says
The strategy's recognition that challenges to Europe's international role and profile come from within as much
as from without marks an important change of perspective. The EUGS plainly recognises that "We live in times
of existential crisis, within and beyond the European Union. Our Union is under threat." In her foreword,
Mogherini underscores that "The purpose, even existence, of our Union is being questioned." However, she
also states that "This is no time for uncertainty: our Union needs a Strategy." The EUGS stresses the need for a
"stronger Europe." It is therefore against the background of external and internal crises that the strategy calls
for renewed ambition. According to Mogherini: "We need a shared vision, and common action."
Unusually for a foreign policy strategy, the EUGS does not start with an assessment of the threats and
opportunities facing Europe in the world. The reason is that this assessment was at the core of the review of
Europe's strategic landscape presented by the High Representative in June 2015. That paper described a
world that is becoming more connected and more contested at the same time, and hence more complex,
and defined five broad sets of challenges and opportunities for the EU. These included redoubling the EU's
commitment to European neighbours to the East and dealing with Russia; rethinking the EU's approach to an
increasingly unstable Middle East and North Africa; redefining Europe's relationship with Africa; reviving
Atlantic partnerships and playing a fully-fledged role in Asia. The interests and priority areas fleshed out in
the EUGS are largely consistent with the main tenets of the earlier review.
The first part of the new strategy outlines the interests of the EU's citizens that the EUGS aims to promote –
peace and security, prosperity, democracy, and a rules-based global order. The paper states that "Our interest
and values go hand in hand." It goes on to outline the guiding principles of EU external action, which stem
"as much from a realistic assessment of the strategic environment as from an idealistic aspiration to advance
a better world." Hence the indication of "principled pragmatism" as the North Star of EU global action, to
be pursued through unity ("no clash between national and European interests"), engagement (to "co-shape"
global rules and manage interdependence), responsibility (to tackle crises and conflicts) and partnership (to
share responsibilities). 
The third part of the EUGS is dedicated to the priorities of external action. The first one is the security of the
Union, with a series of commitments to invest in Europe's defence both with a view to pursue "strategic
autonomy" and as a condition to support the transatlantic partnership with the US. Counter-terrorism, cyber
security and energy security are among the other areas for action, which all share strong links between
internal and external security. 
A second priority consists of strengthening state and societal resilience in the extended neighbourhood of
the EU, from Central Asia to Central Africa, through tailored-made and bottom-up approaches and with a
special focus on migration policies. Thirdly, the EUGS lays out the key dimensions of an integrated approach
to conflicts and crises, which has to be multi-dimensional (all relevant policies), multi-phased (across all
stages of conflict), multi-level (from local to global), and multilateral. In dealing with conflicts, the EU will
concentrate its efforts in the surrounding regions to the East and the South, "while considering engagement
further afield on a case by case basis."
The fourth priority identified by the strategy is backing cooperative regional orders, since "regions represent
critical spaces of governance in a de-centred world." With reference to the European security order, the
EUGS outlines a two-pronged approach to Russia, consisting of upholding rules and rights against their
 
violation by Russia while pursuing "selective engagement" with Moscow where interests converge. In the
case of Asia, the focus is on economic diplomacy vis-à-vis China, Japan and India alongside engagement
with ASEAN, but the strategy also calls for scaling up Europe's security role in the region. 
As to the fifth priority – global governance – the EUGS argues for a proactive EU approach to "transform"
and not just preserve the current system, both deepening (trade) and widening (in security and human rights
matters) the reach of international rules and regimes and developing new ones (cyber, space, energy, health,
new technologies). Partnering with all sorts of actors will be required to deliver on these goals.
The fourth and last part of the EUGS presents how the EU intends to fulfil its objectives by investing in a
credible, responsive and joined-up Union. Credibility starts at home and is predicated not only on soft
power but also on a serious commitment to security and defence. "For Europe, soft and hard power go hand
in hand", says Mogherini in her foreword. "Member States will need to move towards defence cooperation
as the norm”, says the EUGS. A responsive Union should be a more rapid and flexible one in carrying out
diplomacy, crisis management and development, while benefiting from an adequate knowledge base,
particularly in EU delegations. Joined-up external action is called for in areas such as economic diplomacy,
migration, security and development as well as concerning cross-boundary threats like terrorism. 
The concluding section of the EUGS includes important pointers for its implementation. For one, the paper
announces the revision of existing sectoral strategies and the implementation of new ones, in line with the
EUGS' priorities. For another, it envisages that the strategy will undergo periodic review (in consultation
with the Council, the Commission and the European Parliament) and that a new process of strategic
reflection will be launched when the EU and its member states deem it necessary. 
The main message: first things first
Strategy making at EU level is inherently a balancing act between the perceptions and priorities of different
state actors and other constituencies. That said, standing back from the 60 pages of the EUGS, a key
message stands out. This is a rough-weather strategy directed to uphold the security and prosperity of
Europeans. In the midst of political crisis, the Union cannot afford to turn inwards but EU foreign policy has
to deliver first and foremost for EU citizens. 
This overall direction may not come across as particularly surprising, as national security and prosperity are
the central purposes of any national foreign policy strategy. However, it is a relatively recent, emerging
orientation for EU foreign policy, after an emphasis on the influence of the Union as a 'normative' or
'transformative' power in the 2000s, when the European project, and order, was not considered threatened. 
The 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS) was arguably a more nuanced document than some of the
narratives that preceded, or have built on, it. At its core, however, the ESS was about a confident Europe
projecting stability and values upon others in a relatively benign international environment. The essence of
the 2016 EUGS is about protecting and promoting Europe's interests, and values, in the face of mounting
external and internal challenges. While the EUGS is much longer than the ESS, it is telling that the word
'interests' recurs 36 times in the former (foreword + full text) and only three times in the latter. It is equally
revealing of their different focus, and of the lingering concern with growing popular dissatisfaction with the
EU, that the EUGS refers 30 times to EU 'citizens' (their interests, security and needs), whereas they were
mentioned just three times in the ESS.
In other words, the so-called 'new normal' – a tougher geopolitical environment alongside contested
politics at home – is 'normalising' EU foreign policy. If this underlying trend is (and has been for some time)
unmistakable, however, it should not be overemphasised either. It is more a difference of degree and
discourse than a Copernican tuning point. For one, Europeans have always been quite alert to their interests
and not necessarily driven by idealistic zeal. Witness the transactional approach with authoritarian regimes
in the Arab world when suitable for member states, the pragmatic turn to bilateralism when multilateralism
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does not deliver, like on trade, or accusations from the developing world of one-way exports of norms and
rules with little consultation.
Additionally, the EUGS approach is more sobering than realist.1 In other words, the strategy does not swing
from an excessive reliance on the power of the rules to the sheer recognition of the rule of power in an
anarchic world. In fact, High Representative Mogherini says in her foreword that "we will invest in win-win
solutions and move beyond the illusion that international politics can be a zero-sum game." Two levels of
assessment should be distinguished here. On one level, zero-sum politics are often practiced in
international relations. Some note that geopolitical calculations are increasingly informing geo-economic
competition, as opposed to economic exchanges softening geopolitical rivalry.2 The problem is that, in a
deeply interconnected world, zero-sum calculations can easily turn into a lose-lose scenario. On another
level, the fact that there has been a revival of zero-sum politics does not mean that an actor like the EU
should simply accept this trend. The EU should be robust enough to withstand competition or antagonism,
and seek ways of setting international affairs on more cooperative grounds.3 This seems to be the direction
taken by the EUGS.
The strategy advocates a sensible, realistic approach to EU foreign policy, conscious of the Union's (political
and material) limits but also of the fact that the world is as competitive as it is interdependent and of the
need to preserve some consistency between utilitarian behaviour and the values defining Europe. In
particular, the strategy stresses time and again that fulfilling Europe's interests depends on the resilience of
states and societies in the neighbourhood, on fostering human security beyond Europe and on supporting
rules-based regional and global governance, which also involves meeting the Sustainable Development
Goals. The EUGS emphasises that Europeans must take more responsibility for their security through a
variety of measures and by boosting Europe's defence policy and capabilities. However, it does not endorse
an outlook mainly predicated on geopolitical rivalries and frictions.
When considering the conveniently broad organising principle of "principled pragmatism", the main
emphasis throughout much of the document goes on the noun. At the same time, the new strategy states
upfront that "Our interests and values go hand in hand." At a very general level any foreign policy broadly
reflects the core values of the actor that carries it out, whether liberal principles, national identities or South-
South solidarity. It is also surely in the interest of the EU to promote its values on the international stage.
However, the EUGS should have been more forthcoming in recognising the dilemmas that are part of the
relationship between interests and values. For example, the 2015 US National Security Strategy (NSS)
grapples with the same tension between normative aspirations and the pursuit of specific interests. While
considering values a strong component of American leadership, however, the NSS acknowledges that
competing priorities require "hard choices." It also underlines that upholding values at home is a necessary
condition for promoting them abroad.4 For its part, the EUGS recalls that the EU's external credibility and
influence will be determined by living up to its values at home, by the quality of democracy in Europe and
by respecting European and international law in all spheres. Yet again, a tall order considering recent
tensions and trade-offs when, for example, dealing with the refugee and migrant flows. 
The EUGS does an overall good job in offering a 'reformist' strategic approach to cope with the 'revolution'
of many of the assumptions that had backed EU foreign policy in the past, namely that the EU values and
model of integration would be a reference for its neighbours and for international cooperation at large. In
particular, it makes Europe's citizens the central beneficiaries of EU's external action. The new strategy
strives to keep the bar of EU foreign policy steady in the face of much stronger winds, while recognising
that the crew is unhappy (internal political crisis), the hull needs fixing (institutional system and capabilities)
and the aspirational surface of the sails needs reducing or the ship could capsize.
The coordinates of the strategic compass
A foreign policy strategy needs to make sense of the multifarious complexity of the international system and
distil the main coordinates for external action. This requires political choices, conceptual framing and
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guidance for policy-making down the line. The EUGS covers an impressive amount of ground. It is a
(sometimes very) dense document, rich with policy pointers and featuring a well-calibrated mix of
continuity and innovation. It builds on the EU experience, seeks to play to its strengths, and argues for
devising new approaches, or upgrade existing ones, to cope with a more complex and fragile environment.
Key strategic coordinates include the following.
Securing Europe
The EUGS shows a new sense of urgency when it comes to ensuring European security. It frames this priority
as one including interconnected internal and external dimensions. As the paper says, "The EU Global
Strategy starts at home." Since many challenges ignore borders, developing a seamless approach that
overcomes internal-external policy divides is a basic strategic coordinate for action. 
The strategy makes clear that Europe's security depends on developments and conditions beyond its
borders, notably in regions surrounding Europe. This requires European engagement, not retrenchment.
However, there is a marked shift in emphasis from crisis management interventions abroad (so far, the core
business of the Common Security and Defence Policy – CSDP) towards protecting Europe against both
external threats and those spanning frontiers, such as terrorism and hybrid threats. There is a more acute
awareness of the vulnerability of Europe, which serves as the basis for indicating a number of measures and
initiatives encompassing defence, counter-terrorism, cyber security, energy security and strategic
communications. 
The paper recalls commitments to mutual assistance and solidarity among member states and, in line with
the emphasis on challenges cutting across borders, advocates tighter links between external action and the
area of freedom, security and justice. One example consists of cooperation between CSDP missions, the
envisaged European Border and Coast Guard and other EU specialised agencies for border protection and
maritime security.  
The sections concerning security and defence feature a renewed level of ambition. The paper stresses that
Europeans must take more responsibility for their security and be ready to deter, respond to and protect
themselves from external threats. In particular, the EUGS states the goal of achieving "strategic autonomy",
namely the capacity of the EU to undertake military action on its own or in cooperation with NATO. The
strategy does not question the sovereignty of member states in defence matters but rightly underscores the
inadequacy of disparate national defence planning cycles to deliver the capabilities needed for Europe's
defence. Instead, the paper codifies and endorses a number of proposals currently on the table to foster
cooperation among member states in procuring capabilities, deliver EU funding for defence research, support
the European technological and industrial base and establish better operational structures to plan and
conduct operations under the CSDP. Plus, the EUGS envisages follow-up action through a sectoral strategy
defining "the civil-military level of ambition, tasks, requirements and capability priorities" for the EU.
The poor track record of the last decade and current EU politics give ground for scepticism on prospects for
significant progress towards "strategic autonomy."5 Member states have entered into many commitments in
the past but not fulfilled them.6 The fact that, after years of sometimes drastic decline, defence budgets are
up again in 2016 in the majority of EU countries and further rises are expected in coming years may point
to a new pattern. A Franco-German paper published on the same day as the EUGS calls for a European
Security Compact, including the establishment of a "European semester" on defence capabilities – a process
to regularly review national defence spending. So far, however, budget increases are modest and, more
importantly, multinational cooperation on procurement remains limited and fragmented. 
A related and critical question is for what Europeans are willing to use military means. Territorial defence
is back, essentially through NATO, and the security of the EU external borders is a growing priority,
including the maritime dimension. When it comes to external interventions, the EUGS does not offer much
guidance. It calls for the EU to be able to play a more effective role in stabilisation and peacebuilding
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operations, notably in supporting peace agreements and providing capacity building. Beyond ongoing
operational commitments, however, Europeans do not seem to have much appetite for joining forces and
deploying troops in highly unstable environments, where a foreign presence could become the target of
different armed factions and terrorist groups. 
A focus on the extended neighbourhood
The new strategy deliberately avoids a geographical approach of breaking down objectives and instruments
per global regions. It adopts a functional approach, laying out key priorities and how to achieve them.
However, the 2003 ESS finding that "Even in an era of globalisation, geography is still important" reads all
the more relevant today. 
The EUGS confirms the EU's strategic focus on its neighbourhood and surrounding regions, stretching the
definition of this area from Central Asia to Central Africa. "We will take responsibility foremost in Europe
and its surrounding regions, while pursuing targeted engagement further afield." This is the large strategic
space where efforts to improve societal and state resilience and to prevent, manage and resolve conflicts
and crises are supposed to concentrate. 
When defining priorities for supporting regional orders, the European security order and the Middle East
and North Africa clearly come first. Following Russia's violation of international norms, the annexation of
Crimea and the destabilisation of Ukraine, the paper warns that "peace and stability in Europe are no longer
a given." As reported above, the EUGS seeks to strike a balanced approach to the fraught relationship with
Russia, stressing serious differences while recognising the need for dialogue and cooperation. The EU
should stand united in defence of international norms – whose respect is the premise for "substantial
changes" in relations with Russia – and consider "selective engagement" with Moscow where interests meet.
Concerning the Middle East, among many other issues, the strategy uses rather prudent language on the
difficult relationship with Turkey, calling for deepening sectoral cooperation while striving to anchor Turkish
democracy and pursuing the accession process, based on related conditions. Further afield, the EUGS calls
for pursuing "balanced engagement" in the volatile Gulf region, including cooperation with Gulf
Cooperation Council (GCC) countries as well as gradual engagement with Iran in various sectors.
The gravest security challenges that the EU faces originate in the regions surrounding it, and the Union
needs to raise its game to deal with them. However, the strategy does not seem to subscribe to the idea of
'regional power' Europe. For example, it calls for a more political approach to Asia, which includes
contributing to Asian security alongside the currently prevalent focus on economic diplomacy, and it
envisages a major role for Europe in reinforcing and expanding a rules-based global order as well as a
"global maritime security provider."
In other words, the EUGS looks at the distinction between 'regional power' and 'global power' Europe not
as an alternative but as a continuum. Along this continuum, what changes is the spectrum, or intensity, of
Europe's responsibility and engagement. In their extended neighbourhood, the EU and its member states
should be prepared to perform as full-fledged partners and security providers. Further away, the EU should
foster partnerships, connections and reforms on a range of issues but would play a selective and non-
principal role in regional geopolitics and security affairs. On the global stage, the EU can make an important
difference by investing in global governance. The picture that emerges is one of a multi-regional power with
global presence and outreach. 
In practice, given Europe's finite resources, political context and geopolitical location, it is likely that much of
the EU's bandwidth will continue to be absorbed by its neighbourhood. Beyond that, a critical condition for
Europe to punch its weight will be that member states better coordinate their own bilateral relationships with
key actors, such as with China. The recent Communication including elements for a new EU strategy towards
China highlights many opportunities for reciprocal benefits and closer cooperation but also strikes a harder
tone than previous documents in defence of Europe's economic interests within the partnership.7 In the last
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few years, national capitals have sought to conquer markets and attract investment with rather little regard for
the EU-level partnerships. A more joined-up approach would be a considerable step forward and very much
help to enhance the EU profile, and interests, both with regards to China and in other global regions. 
Building resilience
The EUGS confirms Europe's goal to promote the stability of surrounding regions by improving peoples'
lives and states' governance there. With a view to that, it outlines an approach rooted in the actual political
and material conditions on the ground. As pointed out in the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) review
of November 2015, the EUGS calls for a differentiated and tailor-made approach to neighbours, depending
on whether they seek stronger ties with the EU or not.8 In other words, effective relationships with
neighbours require first and foremost resilient countries – countries that are well governed and where
growth lifts people living standards.
The notion of resilience – "the ability of states and societies to reform, thus withstanding and recovering
from internal and external crises" – is the new conceptual anchor for a variety of lines of action. This
concept is left broad enough to encompass many dimensions, from democratic institutions to sustainable
development. However, the accent moves from a transformative narrative mainly centred on democracy
promotion to creating the conditions and capacity for sustainable, endogenous political processes and
economic development. The EUGS both presents a narrative that better fits evolving practice and calls to
further develop innovative instruments to boost resilience.
The strategy draws a distinction between the countries part of the enlargement process – the Western
Balkans and Turkey; the close neighbours – the countries falling within the scope of the ENP; and countries
in surrounding regions. This distinction is based on the policy framework that the EU applies and on what
the EU has to offer to respective partners – whether membership, association and deep trade agreements or
development cooperation and capacity building. Beyond these distinctions, however, the strategy seems to
acknowledge that EU influence depends more on the actual demands and expectations of third countries
than on what the EU has to offer. Or at least, the starting point should be to assess what the EU's partners
want from it. Hence the overall focus on the various dimensions of fragility that affect many of the countries
around the EU and the call for tailor-made partnerships and policies that fit both EU interests and the
political realities and socio-economic requirements of third countries. The bottom-up, practical approach
to build resilience is welcome. However, the operationalisation of this concept will likely present the EU
with a number of challenges, in particular when dealing with no-democratic countries.9
Flexibility
Flexibility is the common denominator of a double balancing act that runs through the entire strategy. For
one, at the political level, the effort to reconcile unity of purpose with the diversity of national outlooks and
experiences. For another, at the operational level, the drive to shape comprehensive, joined-up approaches
while defining in a timely way targeted, tailor-made policy packages to respond to needs. 
As to the political level, the strategy repeats time and again that the EU must stand united at home to punch
its weight abroad and to confront threats. It rightly states that the EU's credibility hinges on its unity,
achievements and power of attraction. At the same time, the EUGS considers Europe's diversity a source of
strength – "a tremendous asset provided that we stand united and work in a coordinated way." It subscribes
to the familiar line that what matters is not so much to speak with one voice but to carry the same message. 
The debate on diversity needs unpacking. At the policy level, diversity can indeed be an asset (expertise,
networks, different capabilities and diplomatic styles) when mobilised for shared purposes. At the political
level, with Europe's political cohesion very much weakened by many crises and the Brexit vote, political
trends in the EU seem to accentuate the centrifugal dimensions of diversity among member states. The
political context is one where different national priorities and threat assessments often complicate common
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8positions and where member states have undertaken in the last few years important foreign policy initiatives
with little or no consultation of their peers or of EU bodies.
Differentiation per se is neither good nor bad for EU foreign policy. The question is what member states
make of it; whether it produces convergence or divergence. Recently, differentiation has often reflected the
trend towards the renationalisation of EU foreign policy. Conversely, national initiatives anchored in the
common institutional framework and channelled towards shared goals can contribute much to EU foreign
policy. The EUGS stresses that "our diplomatic action must be fully grounded in the Lisbon Treaty." It
envisages that the High Representative can invite, under the responsibility of the Council, member states or
groups of them, willing and able to contribute, to implement the agreed positions of the Council. The High
Representative is also tasked to keep the Council informed and to ensure consistency with other EU
policies. In short, flexibility under clear rules may be the best way for the EU to benefit from the diversity
of its member states on the international stage while preserving a common front. 
As to the operational level, the capacity to deploy a comprehensive, integrated approach to deal with
complex crises has long been considered a comparative advantage of the EU. The strategy mainstreams this
approach across a variety of challenges and policy areas including tackling conflicts and building peace,
dealing with migration, confronting threats that cut across EU borders, fulfilling the Sustainable Development
Goals, addressing state fragility and capacity-building, as well as pursuing energy diplomacy, cultural
diplomacy and economic diplomacy. Joined-up action is of course required not only among EU institutions
but also and crucially between the EU and member states and among the latter. Joint programming in the
development field and multinational cooperation in defence procurement are cases in point. 
At the same time, the strategy seeks to combine joint action with a more flexible, agile and responsive
posture to cope with "predictable unpredictability." Tailor-made approaches are advocated to foster relations
with countries in the EU neighbourhood and beyond. The strategy also states that "development policy will
become more flexible and more aligned with our strategic priorities." In particular, greater flexibility is
needed to mobilise financial instruments in the development field, for example with a view to conflict
prevention and civil society support. 
In short, the EUGS calls for the EU to be able to assemble, in a timely way, policy packages that match the
realities on the ground and are not defined by the EU's institutional or policy divides. The point is not for
all institutional actors and tools to be engaged all the time, which would be cumbersome and out of sync
with the pace of foreign policy, but for the EU to deploy a more nimble, modular approach. From this
standpoint, flexibility is not in contradiction with an integrated, joined-up approach, but an enabling
condition for it to be effective. 
Partnership
Together with unity, the strategy outlines engagement, responsibility and partnership as guiding principles
of EU foreign policy in addressing challenges, delivering public goods and supporting a rules-based global
order. This is in line with the EU's long-standing commitment to manage interdependence through
international cooperation. Here too, the strategic coordinates provided by the EUGS feature a mix of
continuity and innovation. The basic message is that the EU cannot rest on its considerable track record as
a multilateral entrepreneur – in other words, it cannot be a status quo power bent on preserving the existing
order. In an international context where power has been diffusing between states and beyond them, and
ideas compete, the strategy acknowledges that resisting change is not an option. Doing so might trigger the
erosion of existing multilateral bodies and foster the emergence of alternative groupings. Hence the
"aspiration to transform rather than simply preserve the existing system."
This aspiration translates in a number of envisaged measures to reform international bodies, strengthen the
EU's visibility and cohesion therein and invest in the UN system and particularly in peace-keeping and
 
9peace-building efforts. Among other areas of further commitment, sustainable development, climate change,
trade and non-proliferation stand out. It is also important that the EUGS points to areas "at the frontiers of global
affairs" requiring the development of new rules such as cyber, space, biotechnologies, artificial intelligence,
robotics and remotely piloted systems. As technological innovation spreads worldwide much faster than in the
past, rule-making on these matters will indeed be crucial to Europe's security and prosperity. 
The strategy confirms that the EU should lead by example in a number of areas. However, it also points out
that the EU "cannot deliver alone" and highlights that the EU should seek to co-shape global rules based on
the principle of co-responsibility with other international actors. Partnering is therefore the lynchpin between
the proactive EU stance and the requirement to work with others. Consistent with its approach to other fields
of action, the strategy calls for a pragmatic and flexible posture. The EU should perform "as an agenda-shaper,
a connector, coordinator and facilitator" within networks of state and non-state actors and international
organisations. The issues at stake should determine the adequate format to deliver solutions. 
The EUGS approach departs from Europe's traditional emphasis on institutional and inclusive multilateralism
and draws closer to the more instrumental, result-oriented attitude to international cooperation of the US.
However, this is not a full swing. The strategy restates the EU's commitment to the UN system and its reform,
and underscores the EU's distinctive investment in supporting, and working with, regional governance and
regimes. This level of engagement appears today of growing relevance to other actors as well, such as in the
case of the US when dealing with Asia. 
In line with the flexible approach it advocates, the EUGS shuns lists or categories of EU partners on the
international stage. The US is the only country defined as a "core partner" but the same terminology is used for
the UN or NATO. The importance of the transatlantic partnerships is stressed with reference to both European
security and global governance. For the rest, the strategy generally speaks of cooperation with like-minded
countries and strategic partners. In short, practice will determine which partner is strategic for what. Besides,
the EUGS puts a stronger emphasis than in the past on partnering with non-state actors, whether in building
resilience, supporting human rights or regulating new technologies.  
The strategy's ambitious global governance agenda presents the EU with various challenges. For one, member
states have so far been less than keen to trigger or support reforms in international institutions that would see
their clout or position shrink in favour of emerging actors. There is also a question on how internal crises will
affect progress towards a stronger presence of the EU as such in multilateral frameworks. For another, the EU
will need to promote sufficient coherence between different formats and levels of cooperation. From climate
to development, from health to security issues, large and complex governance systems have emerged in the
last two decades, including a number of formal and informal groupings, multilateral bodies and bilateral
partnerships. This entails a risk of duplication, forum shopping, conflicting agendas and the dispersal of
resources and political capital. While some flexibility is surely in order, the EU should also concentrate on how
to connect different levels of cooperation and governance initiatives. This includes those promoted by rising
powers in parallel to existing formats, such as in the development field, so that different bodies act in
complementary ways.
Hic sunt leones: from words to deeds
The EUGS ticks many boxes. It provides an overall rationale for EU foreign policy; outlines sound organising
principles; selects priorities in ways broadly consistent with EU interests; points to shortcomings in capabilities
and procedures; and it offers quite a bit of guidance for further action. The aspirational dimension of the
strategy often grates with both the practice of European foreign policy-making and the constraints imposed by
internal and external crises. The aspirations-reality gap is a challenge for any international actor wishing to
advance liberal values and hard interests at once in a competitive strategic landscape. The distinctive character
of the EU, as a collective international actor composed of several institutions and member states, compounds
this challenge. The EUGS seeks to narrow the aspirations-reality gap through "principled pragmatism", namely
by toning down aspirations and calling for more tailor-made and joined-up approaches. Both moves are
sensible, even if only practice will tell how much consistency the EU will be able to afford. 
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The document sets out to chart "the way between the Scylla of isolationism and the Charybdis of rash
interventionism" for the EU on the global stage. To borrow from this metaphor, the strategy itself now needs
to chart its way between the Scylla of oblivion and the Charybdis of implementation. Neither risk is specific
to this document. Strategic documents can be overtaken by events or simply discreetly shelved. Procedural
complexities and bottlenecks or the sheer opposition of vested interests can hamper the mainstreaming of
strategic guidelines through large, articulate bureaucracies. In the case of the EUGS, however, both sets of
risks are particularly pronounced. 
Already torn by several crises, the post-Brexit vote EU is a pretty toxic environment for setting out big
strategic visions. Member states have welcomed the presentation of the new document at the European
Council in late June but the extent of their actual political backing of the strategy remains uncertain.
However, the June European Council has invited to High Representative, the Commission and the Council
to take the work on the EUGS forward. The implementation of the EUGS will depend not only on
convergence and cooperation among member states but also on EU institutions (notably the European
External Action Service and the Commission) joining forces and pulling in the same direction, while
enhancing flexibility and responsiveness.
High Representative Mogherini was of course aware of all that when she submitted the new strategy to EU
leaders at the June summit, despite the Brexit vote shockwave. She has made a political choice because, as
the EUGS puts it, precisely at a time of existential crisis "Forging unity as Europeans – across institutions,
states and peoples – has never been so vital nor so urgent." Besides, she probably felt that no better window
of opportunity would open soon to unveil the strategy. Meanwhile, Europe's crisis requires indeed a strong,
shared political response, delivering tangible benefits to EU citizens. Foreign and security policy must be
part of that response. The question is now to manage expectations, achieve results and sustain the debate.
The EUGS should be seen as a point of departure, and not of arrival. It is an important milestone in a
broader process of strategic debate and 'confidence-building' among EU bodies, member states and the
European strategic community at large. It also marks a change of gear because it provides guidance for
action. The periodic review of the EUGS and of its implementation, envisaged by the strategy itself, can help
keep the process on track and reinforce over time a common strategic culture and sense of purpose.10
The EUGS in itself will not be a decisive factor in catalysing national positions around common ones but it
provides a valuable contribution to that end. It offers a point of reference for a soul-searching EU. Prospects
for major steps forward in Europe's foreign policy and external action are scarce in the short-term. It will
therefore be important to kick off work on selected areas for implementation that can concretely enhance
the EU's effectiveness and added value and, consequently, create incentives for member states to join forces
at EU level.
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